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CASE NOTED
DENIAL OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE IN
SHAREHOLDERS' SUITS AGAINST
CORPORATIONS
Shareholders of the First American Life Insurance Company of
Alabama brought a class action against First American and some of its
directors, officers, and controlling persons, alleging violations of the 1933
and 1934 federal securities acts, including SEC rule 10b-5. Violations of
the Alabama blue-sky laws, and common law fraud were also alleged.
Additionally, the plaintiff shareholders claimed that the corporation itself
was damaged by various fraudulent purchases and sales of securities.
Thus, they asserted a derivative action on behalf of the company against
the individual corporate officers, directors, and control persons. Both the
corporation's attorney and the president of the corporation, Schweitzer,
who had acted as First American's attorney in connection with the issue
of the stock involved in the suit, objected to certain questions put
to Schweitzer on deposition. It was contended that the attorney-client
privilege, claimed by the corporation through its lawyer, did not permit
Schweitzer to answer questions regarding his advice to the corporation as
its attorney. The Alabama Federal District Court ordered Schweitzer to
answer, holding that the attorney-client privilege was unavailable as
against the plaintiff shareholders. On appeal to the Fifth Circuit; held:
In a shareholders' suit against their corporation" where good cause has
been shown, the corporation may not claim the attorney-client privilege
to avoid discovery by shareholders of corporate records, which might
otherwise be privileged. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 193 (5th Cir.
1970), afl'g 280 F. Supp. 1018 (N.D. Ala. 1968).
Generally, every person owes a duty to the state to aid in the administration of justice by testifying and otherwise giving evidence. In the
absence of a privilege, such as the attorney-client privilege, "the public has
a right to every man's2 evidence," which is a right that has existed for more
than three centuries.
The history of the attorney-client privilege goes back to 16th Century
England.8 According to Wigmore, it is the oldest of the privileges for
confidential communications. 4 Originally, the privilege "belonged" to the
1. Apparently, whether the suit is a derivative suit, which is an action brought on
behalf of the corporation as plaintiff, or simply a suit by stockholders against the corpora-

tion as defendant is not a basis upon which this case can be distinguished. Garner v.
Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1970).

2. 8 J. WIGMORE, EviDENcE § 2192 (J. McNaughton ed. 1961); 58 AM. JU., Witnesses
§ 29 (1948).

3. J. WrMoRE, EvmENcE § 2290 n.1 (J. McNaughton ed. 1961); Pye, Fundamentals of
the Attorney-Client Privilege, 15 PRAC. LAW. 15, 16 (Nov. 1969).
4. 8 J. WIGmoR, EvmizNcz § 2290 (J. McNaughton ed. 1961).
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attorney and was based upon the attorney's honor to keep the secrets of
his clients. However, by the end of the 1700's, the voluntary pledge of
secrecy or "point of honor" basis for the privilege was repudiated by the
courts. It was replaced by a new theory which "looked to the necessity of
providing subjectively for the client's freedom of apprehension in consulting his legal adviser." 5 The purpose of the privilege's maintenance today
has been explained by McCormick:
[Lawyers] can act effectively only if they are fully advised of the
facts by the parties whom they represent. Such full disclosure
will be promoted if the client knows that what he tells his lawyer
cannot, over his objection, be extorted in court from the lawyer's
lips. The proposition is that the detriment to justice from a
power to shut off inquiry to pertinent facts in court will be outweighed by the benefits to justice (not to the client) from a
franker disclosure in the lawyer's office. 6
The privilege became, and still is, the client's-not the lawyer's.7 Wigmore,
in an often-quoted summary, has itemized the essential requirements of
the privilege as follows:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by
the client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7)
from disclosure by himself or by the legal adviser, (8) except
the protection be waived.8
Although a Federal District Court in Illinois once held that a corporation could not avail itself of the attorney-client privilege, reasoning that
the corporation did not fall within the definition of "client," 9 that decision
was reversed by the Seventh Circuit, 10 and today, there seems little doubt
that a corporation is entitled to the same treatment as any other client
and may assert the privilege." The Fifth Circuit, in Garner v. Wolfinbarger, recognized the general availability of the privilege to corporate
5. Id.
6. C. MCCORMICx, HANDBOOK OP THE LAW Or EVIDENCE § 91 (1954). See also ALT,
MODEL CODE or EVrDENCE, rule 210, comment a (1942).
7. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1970). See also 8 J. WIcMORE,
EVMENCE §§ 2290, 2320 (J. McNaughton ed. 1961); 58 AM. JurR., Witnesses §§ 460-62
(1948); Annot., 98 A.L.R.2d 241 (1964).
8. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292 (J. McNaughton ed. 1961).
9. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 209 F. Supp. 321 (N.D. I1. 1962);
Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill. 1962).
10. 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963).
11. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1970). See also United States v.
Louisville & N.R.R., 236 U.S. 318 (1915); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n,
320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963), rev'g 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Ill. 1962) ; Schwimmer v.
United States, 232 F.2d 855 (8th Cir. 1956) ; Belanger v. Alton Box Board Co., 180 F.2d
87 (7th Cir. 1950) ; Lalance & Grosjean Mfgr. Co. v. Haberman Mfgr. Co., 87 F. 563 (2d
Cir. 1898); Robertson v. Commonwealth, 181 Va. 520, 25 S.E.2d 352 (1943); Simon, The
Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations,65 YArx L.J. 953 (1956).
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entities; however, under the facts of the case before them, they denied
First American's claim of privilege upon the following grounds:
1. that there are certain obligations or duties that run from
the corporation to the stockholder;
2. that the privilege has never been absolute, and there have
been traditional exceptions for
a. communications in contemplation of12a crime or fraud, and
b. communications to a joint attorney.
In reaching the decision noted herein, both the Fifth Circuit and the
district court cited two English cases-Gourrand v. Edison Gower Bell
Telephone Co.'8 and W. Dennis & Sons, Ltd. v. West Norfolk Farmers'
Manure & Chemical Co. 4 Both cases analogized the duty of the corporation to its stockholders to the duty of a trustee to the cestui que trust."
In the Gourrand case, the chancery court held that the corporation could
not refuse to produce documents which had been purchased with money
belonging to the party applying for their production.'
The District Court's reliance upon these two cases has been criticized
by a number of legal writers who claim that the trust analogy fails in
application to the modern corporation.' 7 Cases which permit management
to spend corporate funds in proxy contests with groups of shareholders
have been cited by these critics to illustrate the point that the corporation
and the stockholders are not one and are unlike trustee and beneficiary.'
In the instant case, the Fifth Circuit simply avoided the controversy
concerning the validity of the trust analogy. Although the court stated
that "the responsibility of officers and directors toward the shareholders of
a corporation ...

is an important factor in our decision,"' 9 it declined to

categorize or analogize that responsibility. Instead, the court relied only
to a limited degree on the English authorities in the following manner.
Both [English] cases treat the relationship between the shareholder and company as analogous to that between beneficiaries
and trustees, a basis which the defendants in the present case
say has no viability for American corporations. Though not
binding precedents, these English cases are persuasive recognition that there are obligations, however characterized,that run
12. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1970).
13. 57 L.T. Ch. 498, 59 L.T. 813 (1888).
14. 2 All E.R. 94, 112 L.J. Ch. 239, 169 L.T. 74, 59 T.L.R. 298, 87 Sol. Jo. 211 (1943).
15. Contra, In re Prudence Bonds Corp., 76 F. Supp. 643 (E.D.N.Y. 1948).
16. Gourrand v. Edison Gower Bell Tel. Co., 57 L.T. Ch. 498, 59 L.T. 813 (1888).
17. Comment, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Shareholder's Suits, 69 CoLTJM. L. REV.
309, 315 (1969); Burnham, The Attorney-Client Privilege in the Corporate Arena, 24 Bus.
LAW. 901, 908 (1969) ; Brereton, Abrogation of the Corporate Privilege in Stockholder Suits,
15 PRAC. LAW. 24, 25 (Nov. 1969).
18. Comment, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Shareholder's Suits, 69 CoLum. L. Rv.
309, 318 & n.40 (1969).
19. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1970).
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from corporation to shareholder and must be given recognition
in determining the applicability of the privilege."0
Traditionally, communications made by a client to his attorney during or before the commission of a crime or a fraud for the purpose of
2
being guided in its commission have not been privileged1.
In Garner v.
Wolfinbarger, the case noted herein, the plaintiff shareholders alleged,
among other things, common law fraud and violations of SEC rule 10b-5
and therefore this exception to the attorney-client privilege was the second
ground for the court's decision. Of course the court recognized that legal
advice secured in aid of a defense of past misconduct is distinguishable
from that sought during or before the act, the former being privileged. 2
However, the court saw no distinction between criminal transactions and
fraudulent actions or acts of questionable legality-the differences between
these, the court said, are of degree, not of principle. 23
The third ground upon which the Garner decision was based was
the "joint-attorney" exception to the attorney-client privilege. When the
same attorney acts for two or more persons with a common interest,
neither party may exercise the privilege against the other.2 4 According
to one legal writer, who criticized the lower court's decision in this case,
"the only possible reason for denying the privilege to a corporation as
against its shareholders would be based on the traditional 'joint attorney'
exception .... 25 However, the author said that it would be difficult to
apply this exception to management and shareholders because the two
so often have adverse interests.26
It cannot be said, therefore, that the court looked to any one ground
in making this far-reaching determination; instead it balanced and combined a number of factors.2 7 With a brief note, the court also passed upon
two other issues of some importance. 28 First, the court saw no distinction
20. Id. at 19 (emphasis added).
21. Union Camp Corp. v. Lewis, 385 F.2d 143 (4th Cir. 1967); Pollock v. United
States, 202 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1953) ; United States v. Bob, 106 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1939);
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950); Annot., 16
A.L.R.3d 1029 (1967); C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 99 (1954).
22. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1970). See generally J. McCoRMIcX,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 99 (1954).
23. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1970).
24. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1970); Grand Trunk W.R.R. v.
H.W. Nelson Co., 116 F.2d 823 (6th Cir. 1941); C. McCoRMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW
OF EVIDENCE § 95 (1954); 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2312 (J. McNaughton ed. 1961).
25. Comment, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Shareholder's Suits, 69 COLUm. L. REv.
309, 317 (1969).
26. Id. at 317-18.
27. A second important issue in this case is the conflicts of law problem. The court used
the balancing approach to this issue as well. In a federal question case, to what law does
the federal court refer for a solution to an evidentiary problem? See generally, Annot., 95
A.L.R.2d 320 (1964) (federal courts follow the law of the forum state with respect to
privileged communications).
28. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1970).
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between the way in which house counsel and outside counsel should be
regarded for purposes of the privilege. This has, apparently, been an
issue in the past.29 Second, regardless of who pays the attorney's fees-the
corporation or management on its own behalf-the privilege may still
be unavailable. This expands the exception to the privilege even further,
and may be contrary to W. Dennis & Sons, which permitted shareholders
to discover documents relating to company affairs unless the documents
came into existence as a part of the defense to the litigation and after
the initiation of the litigation." Furthermore, the district court decision,
from which this appeal arose, apparently applied only to communications
between lawyer and corporation prior to the filing of the suit."
Although this was a case of first impression on the federal appellate
level, a number of decisions other than the two English cases cited have
been rendered subsequent to the district court's opinion. 2 All have
followed the lower court's opinion, denying the privilege when shareholders of the corporation have sued the corporation. In Fischer v.
Wolfinbarger, the court stated absolutely:
A corporate entity acts only for its shareholders, and they are
entitled to see written communications and to inquire concerning
oral communications
between their corporation and its at83
torneys.
In Pattie Lea, Inc. v. District Court of Denver, the Colorado Supreme
Court denied the accountant-client privilege to the corporation, where it
was sued by some of its shareholders. It based its holding on the "jointattorney" exception and upon the fact that "a corporation entity acts

only for its stockholders.

....
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It has been said that the law relating to the attorney-client privilege
is "one of the most hazy frontiers of the discovery process."8 5 Although
there are few reported cases on the privilege when claimed by the corporation in a shareholder's suit, the trend is very clear-the shield cannot be
used to forestall shareholder discovery of otherwise privileged corporate
documents and oral communications between the attorney and the corpora29. Wise v. Western Union Tel. Co., 39 Del. 456, 178 A. 640 (1935); Annot., 98
A.L.R.2d 241 (1964); Pye, Fundamentals of the Attorney-Client Privilege, 15 PRAc. LAW.
15 (Nov. 1969).
30. W. Dennis & Sons, Ltd. v. West Norfolk Farmers' Manure & Chem. Co-op Co.,
Ltd., 2 All E.R. 94, 112 L.J Ch. 239, 169 L.T. 74, 59 T.L.R. 298, 87 Sol. Jo. 211 (1943).
31. Garner v. Wolfinbarger, 280 F. Supp. 1018, 1019 (N.D. Ala. 1968).
32. Fischer v. Wolfinbarger, Nos. 5911 and 5919 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 29, 1969); Fischer
v. Wolfinbarger, 45 F.R.D. 510 (W.D. Ky. 1968); Dahlke v. Morrison, No. 69-497 (N.D.
Ala. Oct. 3, 1967); Pattie Lea, Inc. v. District Court of Denver, 161 Colo. 493, 423 P.2d 27
(1967).
33. 45 F.R.D. 510, 511 (W.D. Ky. 1968).
34. 161 Colo. 493, 496, 423 P.2d 27, 30 (1967).
35. Stone v. Grayson Shops, 8 F.R.D. 101, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1948).
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tion. With this decision, the stockholder has been put a little more on a
parity with the management, whom he pays, who is supposed to be
working for him, any yet whose interests, according to one legal writer,
are so often adverse to his. 8
SHERRYLL MARTENS DUNAJ
36. Comment, The Attorney-Client Privilege in Shareholder's Suits, 69 CoLum. L.
309 (1969).

REv.

